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CHAPTER I
STATEMENT OE PURPOSE
Under the heading of "socialization" there lies a 
broad, pervasive problem that has been the interest of the 
behavioral and social sciences for a long time. The prob­
lem, as stated by Child, involves the understanding and 
prediction of the ". . .process by which an individual, 
born with behavioral potentialities of enormously wide 
range, is led to develop actual behavior which is confined 
within a much narrower range— the range of what is custom­
ary and acceptable for him according to the standards of 
his group (7, p. 655)," Central to this problem area is 
the question of how persons are influenced by others in the 
formation of their values and standards, their attitudes, 
beliefs, and tastes.
The present study is aimed at exploring a particular 
problem within this general area; i.e., what determines 
an individual’s choice between competing influences. The 
notion explored here is that the choice of response is a 
function of the intensity and sign of the reinforcements 
that the individual has experienced from major agents of 
influence in his life. Our study attempts to relate ante­
cedent reinforcement with the choice of response to demon-
1
strate its importance as a major predictor of an individ­
ual’s solution to conflicting influences*
While the problem is essentially clinically derived, 
it is tested here within a laboratory methodology using 
mainly the language and constructs of Rotter’s Social 
Learning Theory (31). Basically, this theory embraces 
systematic constructs of expectancy and reinforcement with 
the latter conceptualized in terms of an empirical law of 
effect. Using the framework of Rotter’s theory, then, the 
focus of this study is the isolation and demonstration of 
some of the factors which contribute to a figure’s emer­
gence as the dominant agent of reinforcement for an indi­
vidual; i.e., some of the factors which determine that one 
person will be a more effective influence upon an individ­
ual’s behavior than will some other person.
Parent-child relationships provide an illustrative 
model. Either the father, the mother or both of the par­
ents equally may be the prepotent source of rewards and 
punishments for the ohild. These three basic possibilities 
may, in turn, be broken down further into varying combina­
tions of reinforcement intensity patterns; e.g., the mother 
may be moderately rewarding whereas the father may be 
strongly punitive. Any of these inclincations obviously 
can also vary in degree of intensity along both the reward
and punishment dimensions.1
The model furnished by parent-ohild relationships is 
analogous to the method employed in the present study. The 
general plan employs two confederates of the experimenter 
in a structure that provides them with status superior to 
that of the subject. Each subject receives separate and 
different reinforcement experiences from each of these two 
agents. In a subsequent experimental situation the subject 
is required to give an appraisal of an object in the pres­
ence of the two agents following their disparate evalua­
tions of the same object. On the basis of the antecedent 
reinforoements, predictions are made as to which of the 
agents with whom the subject will show greater concurrence.
Reinforcement patterns within the parent-child rela­
tionship may also vary along a number of other desoriptive 
dimensions such as: technique of reward (kissing and
hugging versus verbal praise versus granting special 
privileges, etc.) and punishmeirtf~(scolding and spanking 
versus expression of disappointment versus deprivation of 
treats and privileges, etc.); or capriciousness of admin­
istering reinforcement as opposed to stable, predictable 
standards of administration; etc. The present study is 
designed, however, only to explore how intensity and sign 
(positive or negative) of agent administered reinforcement 
is related to the individual’s consequent responses.
CHAPTER II
HISTORY AND BACKGROUND
The general plan outlined in the previous section 
provides a method in which pairs of reinforcement patterns 
may be combined and varied. Experimentally varying these 
agent-administered patterns furnishes a test of predictions 
about their effects upon a subject's consequent responses. 
Thus, showing that certain reinforcing patterns are related 
to the subject's choice between agents' evaluations will 
demonstrate which of two experimental reinforcing agents 
will have greater influence over a subject. That is, we 
will be able to show some of the conditions underlying how 
one person, rather than another, will have greater control 
of a third person’s behavior.
Inherent in this procedure is the notion of personal 
influence. As a concept, personal influence has been, and 
is, important to almost all approaches to the study of the 
behavioral sciences. In one form or another concepts 
similar to personal influence play fundamental parts in the 
prediction of human activities. Within the range of psy­
chological approaches such concepts are used to describe 
or predict the formation of social habits, attitudes, 
choice of group membership snd other behavioral phenomena.
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There are many and varied means used to account for 
these behaviors and often different labels appear for what 
is here called personal influence. In general, whether it 
be called identification, copying, prestige, imitation. 
suggestion, influence, or anything else, the common refer­
ence is to the process whereby an individual takes as his 
model the behaviors impressed by some other looked-up-to 
individual.
Similarly, there are a number of different bases by 
which predictions of and about personal influence have been 
made. Among contemporary theories, the most widely held 
influence concept is the classical psychoanalytic one of 
identification.
Within Freudian terms, identification is defined as 
one ego becoming like another so that the first, in certain 
respects, behaves in the same way as the second (10, p. 93). 
With castration fear forcing surrender of sensual desire 
for the mother and of hostile wishes toward the father, 
identification plays the role of a regressive ms.ohanism in 
the boy’s resolution of the Oedipus.
However, the process is not seen as involving one 
individualTs merely copying another person’s behaviors.
The child is seen as identifying, not simply with the 
parents as they are ”. . .but with the idealized parents 
. . .with the superego of the parents (6, pp. 96-97,118).”
6This conceptualization provides the foundation for broader 
applications and extensions of identification within psy­
choanalytic theory.
Some of the later developed extensions conceive of 
threat also as one dynamic source of identification. Anna 
Freud (11), for example, posits the idea of "identification 
with the aggressor.” Here, the process refers to the means 
whereby a frightened child avoids hurt from a threatening 
person by introJecting that person’s characteristics and 
thus protectively transforming himself into a powerful 
aggressive foroe.
Threat to self-esteem also is seen as a source of 
identification as well as threats to one’s physical exist­
ence or physical integrity (33).
Other sources of identification may also be enumer­
ated, but it is sufficient for the purpose of this study to 
note that identification can fall into either one of two 
rough classifications. Blum (6, p. 118) points out that 
current conceptions see identification as serving two dis­
tinct functions; one as a normal, healthy process and the 
other as a defensive mechanism under traumatic conditions.
Three necessary features of the conditions under which 
defensive identification takes place have been stated by 
Sarnoff (34) as: the aggressor must be seen as being
powerful enough to enforce his opinions, the subject is
7dependent upon the aggressor, and the situation denies 
escape from the aggressor.
In addition to a multiplicity of sources and condi­
tions necessary to the psychoanalytic conception of identi­
fication, there are also a number of different ways in 
which the process serves the individual. Sanford (33), in 
disoussing physical threats, says that "apparently the aim 
of identification in such instances is to acquire a sense 
of power and hence to feel equal to the threat (p. 14).w 
Recognizing not only differences in circumstances but also 
differences among individuals he adds
Sometimes in situations of dire threat, the indi­
vidual seeks to protect himself not so much by 
copying the aggressor as by going over to his 
side, by joining forces with him. . . .
In cases of extreme domination, where the 
existence of the subject as an independent- 
choosing, decision-making individual is threatened, 
it seems that he has the alternatives of either 
taking over the ways of his guard or parent or of 
having no personality at all. There may be no 
possible alternative but to submit, but in submit­
ting one may still maintain some sense of self 
through participating in the personality of his 
oppressor. Members of ethnic or sexual minorities 
seem often to exhibit this kind of identification 
with the dominant group. (33, pp. 14, 15)
In summary of the psychoanalytic position, prediction
of personal influence involves consideration not only of
attraction to positive external forces but also avoidance
of actual or potential threat. The effect of either force
is dependent on the strength of the source, functions of
the situation, and oharaoteristics of the individual him­
self.
Prediction of personal influence has also been 
attacked within the framework of contemporary learning 
theories. In the main, however, few of these attempts can 
be seen as little more than a translation of psychoanalytic 
derivations into the terminology of some current behavioral 
system.
Por example, Mowrer (27) attempts a learning theory 
restatement of the identification concept. He, too, oon- 
oeives of two fundamental categories. One, the healthy, 
normal aspects of identification he differentiates and 
entitles "developmental.” Here, infants of both sexes are 
seen as tending to identify initially with the mother.
Boys, however, later begin to take the father as their
I
object of identification. This comes about because, as the 
boy grows, the father’s interest in the boy’s activities 
increases and soon he attains the position of dominant 
reinforcing agent for the boy, becoming the principle 
rewarder and punisher. Approving encouragement is given by 
the father as he perceives more and more imitative behavior 
from the son. Thus, Mowrer sees developmental identifica­
tion between father and son rooted mainly in the reward 
aspect.
Mowrer’s (27) conception of defensive identification
is very similar to the above-described "identification with 
the aggressor” and this appears to be rooted mainly in the 
punishment aspect of the father’s relationship to the son.
Where Mowrer is mainly concerned with the imitative 
behaviors, Whiting and Child (41), within their learning 
theory restatement of identification acknowledge the 
broader implications of influence. They, too, use the term 
imitation but extend its application beyond the actual 
behaviors of the parents (or superior figures) to include 
what they call ’’evaluative responses.” These embrace all 
dicta to the subject whether expressed or implied, whether 
practiced by the authority himself or not. Thus the pro­
cess of identification involves the child’s rewarding him­
self by imitation of the parent’s evaluative responses. 
Sometimes the rewarding is of a negative or punitive 
nature as in their account of guilt as being a consequence 
of identification, (p. 317).
In Miller and Dollard’s (£6) work on imitation we find 
another theoretical attack on the problem of predicting 
personal influence. The term imitation as used by this 
team, however, falls into the narrower, more constricted 
sense in that they deal mainly, but not exclusively, with 
one subject mirroring another person’s behavior.
The three sub-mechanisms used by Miller and Bollard 
(£6) to account for most of the cases for which the term
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"imitation” is ordinarily used are: same behavior— . . 
two people perform the seme act in response to independent 
stimulation by the same cue, each having learned by himself 
to make the response (p. 92)"; copying behavior— the indi­
vidual learns to model his behavior on that of another with 
the individual knowing when and having criteria for when 
his behavior is same or different from "the external 
critic" who rewards similarity and punishes dissimilarity 
(p. 92; and matched-dependent behavior— younger or less 
bright individuals match behavior with, and are dependent 
upon their older or more intelligent associates. The 
dependency aspect in the last phase is implied in the imi­
tator’s response being elicited by cues from the act of the 
leader.
Although a considerable amount of data on infra-human 
imitative behavior has been reported (8, 37), there is not 
a great deal reported in the journals about the study of 
human imitation. One of the few, but often quoted, experi­
ments in this area was done by Miller and Bollard (26).
They ran two groups of twenty children each in a study of 
matched-dependent behavior. One group learned to find the 
reward (candy) in the same box as a leader child. The 
other group learned that they would not find the reward 
where the leader child found his but that theirs would be 
in some other alternate location in the same room.
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The same experiment was replicated by Field and 
reported by Ascii (3). The only difference was that Field 
interrogated her subjects after their performance and 
interpreted the results from a cognitive point of view as 
compared with Miller and Bollardrs stimulus-response ex­
planation.
The point of interest here is that in both experiments 
a large number of children of both groups, on their first 
trial, did not look for their reward in the same box in 
which the leader found his candy; instead they first went 
to alternate locations. Apparently some subjects did not 
have an expectancy of being rewarded for copying the lead­
er’s behavior whereas some others did. Some initially used 
the leader’s cues for approach and some for avoidance (or 
alternative behavior).
In the area of social psychology there have been num­
erous other explorations of personal influence and attempts 
to demonstrate the conditions underlying how one person’s 
behaviors are modified and changed by another’s.
Generally, study of these functions has followed a 
simple and straightforward procedure. First, the experi­
menter establishes how an individual evaluates a certain 
matter. Next, information is given (truly or falsely) 
of how the same matter is appraised by other figures who 
are presumed to be authoritative in the subject’s views.
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The subject’s subsequent reevaluations are then taken to 
get a measure of the modification of his original position.
Sherif (36) coupled prose passages with ratings of 
authors by subjects. The passages were all taken from R.
L. Stevenson in an attempt to equate them for literary 
quality. The subjects, however, were unaware that the 
passages were not from different authors. Sherif concluded 
that ”. . . authors rated high tended to push up the rating 
of the passages attributed to them. . .” and vice versa
(p. 122).
Thorndike (38) studied the modifying effect of reward 
and punishment in the sphere of esthetic judgment and found 
alteration in the suggested direction. He coupled authori­
tative comments (approval or disparagement) with Christmas 
card scenes and poetic couplets.
However, the same qualities were always either 
rewarded or criticized. Simplicity of design and good 
spacing received authoritative approval while ornateness 
and crowding always received unfavorable comment. There­
fore, it is impossible to distinguish effect of authority 
influence from a more simple learning of distinction between 
the two sets of esthetic attributes.
In more recent studies of this type, several experi­
ments have demonstrated the differential effect of positive 
versus negative reinforcement. For example, Mausner (25)
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shows that when a subject is aware that another person's 
performance on a prior relevant task has been successful, 
his own later evaluations will tend to converge with the 
other's significantly more so than if this partner was per­
ceived as being relatively unsuccessful on the initial 
task. In a separate study (24) Mausner shows that a sub­
ject's own initial experience of failure or success is 
related to convergence or non-convergence of judgments 
respectively in a later relevant task with another subject. 
Kelman (15) in an autokinesis situation demonstrated sub­
stantially the same effects.
Beyond the attacks by personality theories and social 
psychology on problems of personal influence there have 
been other studies which we can classify here, arbitrarily, 
as empirical approaches.
For example, while Whiting and Child's extensive work 
(41) attempts a -post hoc explanation in terms of Hullian 
derived Miller and Bollard personality theory, it is 
largely a collection of enormous amounts of anthropological 
data treated with correlational methods, ^heir purpose, 
broadly, was to demonstrate how culture is integrated 
through the medium of personality processes.
In many respects, they show the relationship between 
the early treatment as a child to behaviors in adulthood; 
e.g., a relationship between severity of weaning from
14
infantile dependence and an index of adult anxiety about 
dependence. These relationships are not tested by longi­
tudinal study of the individual but rather by a cross- 
cultural correlation between certain child-rearing prac­
tices and adult behavior systems.
The dependency example is chosen to illustrate not 
only a form and consequence of personal influence but also 
to indicate one of the sources of different and character­
istic response patterns to dependency and achievement which 
will be more fully discussed in later sections of this 
chapter.
Also in a cross-cultural approach, McClelland and 
Friedman (21) took a small number of societies having com­
parable myths and studied the relationship between depend­
ence and concern with achievement. They found that meas­
ures of dependence socialization correlated with the fre­
quency of achievement themes in the myths. They concluded 
that severe treatment of the child's dependencies stem from 
parental values which are coercive to achievement.
Wittenborn (as reported in 7) found positive associa­
tions between two measures of the child's dependence and 
measures of the parent’s frustrating behaviors, rejection 
of the child, and unsympathetic attitudes.
Marian Winterbottom (reported in 7, pp. 675-6) meas­
ured the frequency of achievement-related ideas in stories
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told by 29 young boys. These measures were related to 
sooialization variables obtained from a questionnaire 
filled out by her subjects1 mothers. The findings showed a 
significant positive relation between both frequency of 
rewards and intensity of rewards with the achievement meas­
ure. The rewards were from the mother for the sonrs ful­
fillment of her demands for independent accomplishment. 
There was also a significantly negative relation between 
the achievement measure and the total number of mother- 
imposed restrictions on independent activity. Also in­
cluded in the results was suggestive evidence that high- 
achievement children had been more frequently and intensely 
rewarded for acceptance of restrictions than had low- 
achievement children. Results pertaining to punishment for 
failure to fulfill demands or accept restrictions were not 
significant. However, this latter lack was probably due to 
the fact that the punishment scales showed very little 
variability.
Upon surveying studies of achievement-orientation, 
Child (7, pp. 674 ff.) draws the tentative generalization 
that ". . . the development of persistent striving for 
achievement is influenced by social approval of this behav­
ior and disapproval of its absence (674).” Another item 
very important to this development is the effect of 
pertinent successes and failures in the life history of
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the individual which would indicate a joint influence of 
parental approval-disapproval with success-failure experi­
ences. Sucoess-failure experiences may he distinct and 
differ from parental approval-disapproval in that the 
former can refer to whether or not immediate goals are 
attained, whereas the latter can refer to external values 
placed on the means used by the child in attaining those
goals. Also, parental approval-disapproval further implies
a global pattern of acceptance or rejection of the child.
On the basis of studies of the balance of reward and
punishment, Child predicts that
a relative predominance of differential reward 
rather than punishment, as a technique of social­
ization, should be favorable to imitation of the 
parents by the child and that a relative pre­
dominance of punishment as a technique of social­
ization should make for reduced imitation of the 
parent by the child (7, pp. 685 f£).
While we would accept the first part of Child*s pre­
diction, we would modify the second part and feel that a 
relative predominance of punishment over reward may not 
necessarily make for reduced imitation (or influence) of 
the parent. If a child were faced by two parents such that 
one was more predominantly punishing than the other was 
predominantly rewarding, we would predict a tendency for 
the child to be more influenced by the punitive parent than 
the rewarding parent.
Subsuming related concepts of psychoanalysis, learning
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theory, and social psychology, we have seen that influence 
can be brought about by negative reinforcement; i.e., pun­
ishment, threat, etc. Conceptions and observations of 
identification with the aggressor illustrate this (5, 6, 
11, 33, 34), Mowrerfs "defensive identification" is 
another example (27). Various social-psychological inves­
tigations have demonstrated that antecedent failure exper­
iences are associated for some subjects with a suscepti­
bility of their judgments to converge toward others' (15, 
19, 24, 36, 38). Therefore it is difficult to accept the 
simple prediction that imitation would be reduced by a pre- 
dominance of punishment.
It is a fairly well established observation in psy­
chology that a variation in the intensity or strength of a 
reinforcement is accompanied by a variation in the 
response. In the work cited above as pertinent to the 
present study we find an example in Marian Winterbottom's 
presentation. It will be remembered that she obtained a 
significant relationship between intensity of rewards with 
an achievement measure. McClelland and Friedman, it will 
be recalled, found that severity of dependency socializa­
tion was correlated with frequency of achievement themes. 
Also, both Mausner's and Eelman's results showed that 
variations in the extent of antecedent success-failure 
experiences were associated with variations in the extent
18
that judgments could be coerced.
It also seems reasonable to expect, at some point of 
difference along gradients of intensity, that negative and 
positive reinforcement will differ in respect to which 
occasions greater responsiveness from the subject. While 
we do not have the means for measuring and soaling these 
gradients to make precise predictions for each individual, 
we can use measures of the subjects’ learned, character­
istic responses to success or failure to predict differ­
ences between them. Actually, we would be attempting to 
differentiate the subjects on the basis of their modes of 
response to failure and success by placing them on a des­
criptive dimension running from highly achievement oriented 
at one end to strongly failure-avoidant at the other.
That it is possible and meaningful to characterize 
subjects along this dimension has been attested to by a 
number of studies. For example, Judith Worell (43), in a 
recent empirical attempt to appraise the mathematical rela­
tionship between the constructs of expectancy and rein­
forcement value in Rotter’s Social Learning Theory, found 
that some subjects are extremely cautious in their per­
formance of an experimental task because of a fear of fail­
ure; i.e., it was more important to these subjects that 
they avoid failure than it was that they achieve anything 
positive. On the other hand, other subjects were more
19
oriented toward success, These findings are compatible 
with studies, done within a level of aspiration paradigm, 
which also have demonstrated that some individuals have a 
characteristic success orientation or strive for achieve­
ment as opposed to other individuals who have a character­
istic failure-avoidant orientation or a sensitization to 
potential failure.
Early development of the concept studied level of 
aspiration in relation to goal responses. Three factors 
were considered as involved in level of aspiration behav­
ior: seeking of success, avoiding of failure, and a cogni­
tive factor of probability judgment (16). Later, Sibylle 
Escalona (9) employed a level of aspiration test with 
children and was able to differentiate them on the basis of 
their need to succeed versus their need to avoid failure.
Pauline Sears (35), using a discrepancy score measure 
on a level of aspiration task, found differences between 
children with a history of prevailing failures and more 
successful children.
Rotter (31) reports finding a high frequency of oau- 
tious or protective level of aspiration response patterns 
among crippled college students (who were not handicapped 
on the task itself) at a level great enough to signifi­
cantly distinguish them from other college students.
Neems and Scodel (reported in 31) divided subjects
EO
into two groups depending upon a pattern analysis of their 
performances on a level of aspiration test. One of the 
groups consisted of subjects with score patterns that 
might be designated as indicating dependency or protective­
ness against failure. They found 91% agreement between 
group placement and the subjects’ response patterns on the 
California F-scale. Another study by D. R. Miller (re­
ported in 30) found significantly different level of aspir­
ation behavior among various clinical groups.
Thus, there is much evidence to show that character­
istic modes of behavior enter into individual differences 
in a level of aspiration situation. Also, these character­
istic modes are generalizable and predictive of an individ­
ual’s response in other situations, especially his differ­
ential responses to positive and negative reinforcement.
We can now tie together some of the threads which 
trace through the theoretical and research approaches sum­
marized in this chapter. First, under whatever label it 
may appear, personal influence is seen, in part at least, 
as a function of the rewards and punishments actually or 
potentially administered to an individual by other signi­
ficant figures. Second, there appears to be a relation­
ship between the strength or intensity of these reinforce­
ments and the amount of influence exerted. Third, individ­
uals, on the basis of their life experience of success or
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failure, learn and develop characteristic success-oriented 
behaviors or characteristic failure-avoidant behaviors.
Integrating these three propositions leads to the 
probability that individuals will be influenced to differ­
ent degrees depending upon the prevailing sign and inten­
sity of the rewards received from the reinforcing person. 
Some of the predictions, derived from this proposal, of 
differential influence associated with various reinforcing 
patterns are contained in the following chapter as hypothe­
ses to be subjected to experimental proof.
Before proceeding, however, a brief note should be 
made as to the research models which have been used gener­
ally in personal influence studies and what models may be 
seen as best contributing to a test of the present study. 
For the most part, influence studies have employed the form 
noted earlier. An individuals initial position is noted, 
he is subjected to social pressure, and placement of his 
post-pressure position is noted, ^he extent and direction 
of change between the subject’s pre- and post-pressure 
positions is then taken as a measure of personal influence. 
Procedures of this sort can be found as the basis of a 
majority of the researches conducted under the headings of 
prestige, suggestion, influence, etc. Many of the studies 
employing the autokinetic situation have used this model 
as a vehicle for manipulating different variables to meas-
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are their antecedent effect on suggestibility, social con­
formity, rigidity of judgments and other forms of behavior 
within the concept of influence.
This model has been challenged by Asch (2). He 
attacks what he calls the presupposition that ". . . a 
change of evaluation oonsists of a change of response to a 
constant stimulus, the primary process being the change of 
a stimulus-response connection, or of the strength of a 
given connection (p. 275).” It is his contention that the 
stimulus takes on a change in quality due to a modified 
context rather than the results being due to a change of a 
response to a given stimulus.
There is some question, however, whether Ascii’s criti­
cism is damaging or even pertinent, ^ith a purpose or goal 
of predicting behavior (the evaluation or response), it 
seems sufficient that by varying antecedent conditions in 
some predetermined manner we can predict what consequent 
behaviors may be observed. It is true enough that the con­
text, in which the stimulus is embedded (i.e., the situa­
tion), is changed by varying the antecedent conditions, but 
this represents part of the predictor variable and permits 
empirical measurements of the related consequences. What 
Asch is arguing for appears to be a postdiction of the 
changes in the stimulus that might be derived by study of 
the changes in the response.
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There is, however, another criticism of the above out­
lined model which is more relevant to the present study.
That is, in the case of many prestige-suggestion studies we 
remain unaware as to what antecedents have been varied in 
the experimental procedure. Has the subject been influ­
enced by an authority’s pressure or has he merely learned 
to discriminate those attributes of the material which will 
lead to reward in the experimental situation?
Another model which has been used is the one illus­
trated by the previously mentioned Dollard and Miller study 
of imitative behavior. But, while imitation has proven 
useful as a design for measuring learning or for the explan­
ation of acquisition of new behaviors, it does not encom­
pass all activities which are occasioned by some external 
agent. For example, we can conceive of an untidy mother 
imposing stringent standards of dress and toilet upon her 
child. It is easy to imagine that the child would be neat 
and tidy as a means of securing approval or avoiding cen­
sure, but we certainly would not be able to say that the 
child was imitating the mother.
Because imitation, as used in the matched-dependent 
design, is a relatively narrow concept of similarity of 
behavior it would not be appropriate to a study of personal 
influence as intended here. In the sense of the untidy— 
mother-tidy-child illustration, influence would be more
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similar to the Freudian notion of the child identifying 
with the idealized parents rather than the actual parents.
Also, our intention is to test whether patterns of 
antecedent reinforcement are related to the dominance of 
one agent over another in influencing responses of a third 
individual. Therefore, since we are not interested in 
demonstrating influence per se, the usual prestige—  sug­
gestion design of showing a ohange in the subject's 
appraisal is not applicable.
The model designed for the present investigation is 
one which exposes the subject to experiences of contrasting 
reinforcement from two persons in situations structured to 
present them as also being subjects of the experiment but 
enjoying a status superior to that of the actual subject 
himself. The pressure or experimental situation involves 
the subject in making a relative choice between the two 
reinforcing agents' judgments. The details of this design 
are presented in the chapter after the following statement 
of hypotheses to be tested.
CHAPTER III
HYPOTHESES
In the previous section three general propositions 
were derived which concerned personal influence: that per­
sonal influence is a function of the positive and negative 
reinforcements actually or potentially administered to an 
individual by significant figures, that there is a rela­
tionship between personal influence and the intensity of 
the reinforcements from significant figures, and that indi­
viduals differ in their characteristic responsiveness to 
reinforcement depending on its sign (i.e., whether posi­
tive or negative),
Eollowing from this, the overall prediction can then 
be stated as: subjects* choices between a positive and a
negative reinforcing agents* judgments will be such as to 
maximize the probability of positive reinforcement or 
minimize the probability of negative reinforcement depend­
ing upon the subjects* characteristic modes of response to 
success and failure. It is also predicted that varying 
the degree of contrast between the two agents by varying 
the intensity of the reinforcements will be accompanied by 
variation of the subjects* degree of preference for one of 
the reinforcing agents* judgments over the other’s.
E5
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To test these predictions, two groups of subjects—  
one consisting of success-strivers and the other of 
failure-avoiders— will receive pre-training experiences 
with each of two confederates of the experimenter. From 
one of these agents a subject will receive a series of 
predominantly positive, differential reinforcements on a 
performance task. In a separate experience on another 
similar task, the other agent will administer a sequence of 
predominantly negative reinforcements to the same subject. 
Three paired combinations of reinforcement patterns will 
comprise the treatment conditions for varying the intensity 
of the reinforcements and the degree of contrast between 
the agents. Each pair will combine moderate positive rein­
forcement with either moderate negative, strong negative, 
or ignoring. One third of the total sample of subjects 
will be assigned randomly to each of the three conditions.
Following this training each subjeot will be tested in 
a situation where the agents give differing appraisals of a 
stimulus objeot. The subject will be asked to make his own 
appraisal after hearing those of the two agents. The 
difference between his and each of the others’ will give a 
measure of how much he more closely accords with one agent 
than with the other.
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Stated in null form, the hypotheses to be tested 
within this design are:
(1) Success-striving subjects will not show closer 
accordance with the positive reinforcing agent 
than will failure-avoidant subjects.
{£) There will be no difference in the degree with 
which success-striving subjects accord with 
the positive reinforcing agent when the con­
trast of reinforcing intensity between the 
positive and negative agents differs.
(3) There will be no difference in the degree with 
which failure-avoidant subjects accord with the 
positive reinforcing agent when the contrast of 
reinforcing intensity between the positive and 
negative agents differs.
The direction predicted from Hypothesis 1 is that 
failure-avoidant individuals will be more responsive to 
negative reinforcement than will success-striving individ­
uals. This can also be stated in reverse form; that 
success-striving individuals will show more accord with
approving figures than will failure-avoidant individuals.
—  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Although Rotter’s Social Learning Theory (31) does 
not deal specifically with the problem of influence, the 
systematic relationship of the theory’s constructs of 
expectancy, reinforcement value, and generalized expectancy 
provides a tested framework in which our hypotheses can be 
experimentally tried.
It is also predicted that the same relative direction will 
hold in Hypotheses 2 and 3 which deal with the effects of 




for testing our hypotheses, three different combina­
tions of reinforcement intensities were chosen. These 
three treatment conditions were:
Treatment I: moderate positive reinforcement con­
trasted with moderate negative reinforcement.
Treatment II: moderate positive reinforcement
contrasted with strong negative reinforcement.
Treatment III: moderate positive reinforoement
contrasted with ignoring or no explicit rein­
forcement.
Each of two subject categories, success-striving (SS) 
and failure-avoidant (PA), was randomly divided among these 
three treatments providing a total of six sub-groups of 
subjects.
Selection of Subjects:
To obtain the final sample of forty-eight experimental 
subjects, ninety-two male undergraduate students were 
signed-up for the experiment. All were non-volunteers 
since participation in experiments was a required assign­
ment of their beginning course in psychology. They were 
administered the Jensen-Rotter Group Level of Aspiration 
Test (4, 14, 29, 32). The subjects returned for the
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second session of the experiment on an individually- 
scheduled basis.
Basically, the usual level of aspiration instrument 
provides a sequence of trials on a performance task. The 
subject estimates his potential score on successive trials 
based on the knowledge of his performance score on the pre­
vious trial. The Group Level of Aspiration Test (14, 32) 
utilizes thirteen time-trial digit-symbol substitution 
tests for the sequence of performance items. Variability 
in the level of performance is induced by varying the time 
on the trials although the subject is led to believe that 
the time limits are the same for all the trials.
Scoring consists of three variables* The discrepancy 
score, or D-soore; the frequency of shifts of estimate in 
the pattern following success and failure; and unusual 
shifts which are shifts in estimate that are either up 
after failure or down after success. On the group form 
used here, the D-score is obtained by taking the mean of 
the differences between each performance and the following 
estimate. Twelve differences are available from the 13 
trials. If the estimate is higher than the preceding per­
formance the sign of the differences is plus; if lower it 
is minus. The algebraic sum of these differences divided 
by 12 is the D-score.
Analysis and interpretation of the responses are made
in terms of nine patterns which represent modal standards 
useful for describing the nature and characteristics of 
individualsT expectancies and patterns of response to suc­
cess and failure (29, 32).
The overall distribution of D-scores in the original 
sample ranged from plus 2.25 to minus 7.17 with a median 
of minus 0.64. Individuals were eliminated from the study 
whose level of aspiration patterns were maladjustive in 
type characterized by unrealistic, unstable, confused, 
rigid, or stubborn modes of adaptation. The remaining 
cases consisted of:
Pattern 1. Stable and Fairly Confident, Aggressive.
Pattern 2. Stable, Cautious and Prone to Avoid Risk 
of Failure.
Pattern 3. Stable, Very Aggressive and Self-confi­
dent, Ambitious.
Pattern 4. Achievement-follower, Dependent.
Pattern 7_. Overcautious, Fearful of Failure, Little 
Confidence.
The group form of the test, rather than an individual 
form, was used as it enabled testing groups of 10 to 11 
individuals in a single session. However, this entailed an 
unknown amount of risk in that validity data on the group 
form, especially for a college population, is meager. Also 
the patterns are not discrete, so that it is often diffi­
cult to differentiate between, for example, patterns 1 and 
2. Therefore pattern analysis, except for screening out
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possible maladjusted students, was not relied on to differ­
entiate the two major groups of subjects.
The remaining cases were arranged in scale according 
to their D-score and the experimental sample was obtained 
by counting in twenty-four from the highest positive D- 
score to get the group Success-strivers (SS). Similarly, 
counting in from the highest remaining negative D-score 
provided the experimental group Failure-avoidant (FA).
The twenty-four subjects in each of the two groups were 
then distributed randomly into the three treatment columns 
giving cellular groups of eight subjects in each of the six 
cells of the 2 x 3 matrix. The distribution of subjects’ 
D-soores, by cells, is shown in Appendix A.
Training Tasks:
Two performance tasks were needed in the experimental 
design as instruments in a situation where the agents could 
give the subjects a prearranged sequence of verbal rein­
forcements. Though the sequence was prearranged, the tasks 
were such that the subjects were unaware of this and per­
ceived the reinforcements as a function of the agent’s 
appraisal of his, the subject’s, level of performance. The 
entire experiment had been labeled as being a study in Dis­
crimination and Judgment. The two training tasks were 
devised to appear appropriate to the expressed purpose of 
the experiment.
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The Type Test: This test consisted of twenty 3 x 5-inch
cards on each of which were two lines of typewriter char­
acters. The instructions for this task were as follows:
IN THIS TEST OF VISUAL JUDGMENT AND DISCRIMINA­
TION, YOU WILL BE SHOWN A SERIES OF CARDS. ON 
EACH CARD ARE TWO LINES OF TYPEWRITER CHARACTERS.
ONE LINE IS ALWAYS LONGER THAN THE OTHER. YOUR 
TASK IS TO ESTIMATE, AS CLOSELY AS YOU POSSIBLY 
CAN, HOW MANY MORE LETTERS OR CHARACTERS THERE 
ARE IN THE LONGER LINE THAN THERE ARE IN THE 
SHORTER ONE.
LOOK AT THE SAMPLE CARD. IN THIS EXAMPLE THERE
A.RE 89 LETTERS IN THE LONGER LINS AND ONLY 17 
LETTERS IN THE SHORTER LINE. THEREFORE AN 
EXACTLY CORRECT ANSWER WOULD HAVE BEEN "18."
YOU ARE NOT, OF COURSE, EXPECTED TO BE ABLE TO 
GIVE AN EXACTLY CORRECT ESTIMATE EACH TIME. HOW­
EVER YOU SHOULD TRY TO GIVE THE BEST ESTIMATE YOU 
CAN. YOU WILL BE ALLOWED ONLY APPROXIMATELY 2 
SECONDS TO VIEW EACH CARD.
As an additional realism factor the sequence of items were 
such as to make the whole test appear to become progres­
sively more difficult. Where the initial cards contained 
only upper-case letters, there soon appeared cards with 
randomly interspersed lower-case characters. About half­
way through the test red ribbon was randomly used in 
striking the keys where heretofore only the black ribbon 
had been used. Then, where originally the two lines had 
been parallel to each other but with varying distances 
between them, the lines of type in later items were rotated 
so that they were at an angle to each other.
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The Stick Test; This test consisted of twenty cards, each 
10 x 10 inches, on which were affixed two short lengths of 
wooden dowels. The instructions for this task were as 
follows:
IN THIS TEST OF TACTILE JUDGMENT AND DISCRIMINA­
TION YOU WILL BE GIVEN A SERIES OF CARDS ON WHICH 
TWO LENGTHS OF WOOD ARE FIXED. ONE STICK OF WOOD 
IS ALWAYS LONGER THAN THE OTHER. YOUR TASK IS TO 
ESTIMATE, AS CLOSELY AS YOU POSSIBLY CAN, HOW MANY 
MORS UNITS (show "SCALE OF UNITS") THERE ARE IN THE 
LONGER PIECE THAN THERE ARE IN THE SHORTER PIECE.
HERE IS A SAMPLE CARD. THE LONGER STICK IS JUST 
THREE UNITS GREATER IN LENGTH THAN THE SHORTER 
STICK.
THE REMAINDER OF THE CARDS WILL BE PRESENTED TO 
YOU BY USE OF THIS BOX SO THAT YOU WILL NOT BE ABLE 
TO SEE THE STICKS. YOU WILL MAKE YOUR ESTIMATES 
BY TOUGH AND FEEL, ALTHOUGH YOU WILL HAVE THE 
"SCALE OF UNITS" TO USE AS A GUIDE FOR YOUR ANSWER.
YOU ARE NOT, OF COURSE, EXPECTED TO BE ABLE TO GIVE 
AN EXACTLY CORRECT ESTIMATE EACH TIME. HOWEVER,
YOU SHOULD TRY TO GIVE THE BEST ESTIMATE YOU POSSI­
BLY CAN.
YOU WILL BE ALLOWED ONLY APPROXIMATELY FIVE SECONDS 
TO EXAMINE EACH CARD.
The cards were tendered to the subject one at a time 
through the rear opening of a box 12 x IS x 12 inches so 
that the subject could not see the stimulus items. The 
front of the box, facing the subject, was covered with 
blue, light-proof material. A slit six inches long was out 
in the material three and a half inches above and parallel
to the bottom of the box. The subject placed one hand 
through this slit to feel the sticks with his fingers.
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Additional strips of material were fixed to the inside of 
the front material so that they draped down and free over 
the opening and around the subjects wrist preventing him 
from seeing into the box through the widened slit.
As in the type test, the stick materials were arranged 
to give the appearance of an increasingly difficult task. 
The sizes of dowels were varied, their angular relationship 
was varied, and the distance between them was varied.
The Reinforcements: The reinforcements, as administered by
the agents, were verbal expressions of approval or criti­
cism. They were designed to seem like the personal evalua­
tion of the agent rather than a translation of some imper­
sonal, standardized "right" or "wrong." The expressions 
were selected from a list of forty-five which were ranked 
by ten colleagues of the experimenter. Each statement was 
ranked on two scales. One scale had three points: Moder­
ate positive reinforcement, Moderate negative reinforce­
ment, and Strong negative reinforcement. The other scale 
was a "Quality" dimension referring to the criterion of 
"personal evaluation" mentioned above. The three points in 
this scale were: High, Medium, Low. The final selection
accepted only items on which at least six judges bestowed 
a quality rating of "High" and on which at least eight 
judges were in agreement as to the reinforcement value of 
the statement. Pretesting of the items showed the need of
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some minor modifications: first, in some instances person­
al pronouns had to be added to the statement to lend more 
of a personal air; second, one or two items sounded stilted 
in speech and were made somewhat more colloquial in tone. 
Pretesting also showed that using too many different ver­
balizations through twenty trials aroused subjects’ sus­
picions, and the agent’s repertory was reduced to seven or 
eight repeatable statements.
The list of statements finally selected and used in 
the training trials were as follows:
A1 THAT ONE’S PRETTY GOOD
AS ...... SEEMS PRETTY GOOD TO ME.
A3 I DON’T THINE THAT ONE GAVE YOU ANY TROUBLE 
A4 GOOD
A5 YOU DID PRETTY WELL ON THAT ONE
B1 I UHH....THAT’S NOT TOO GOOD (OR: NOT TOO GOOD)
BS THAT’S A BIT OFF, I’M SURE 
B3 NOT QUITE....
B4 THAT ONE COULD HAVE BEEN BETTER (CLOSER), I 
■THINK
B5 YOU GOT FOOLED ON THAT ONE
Cl THAT’S ’WAY OFF, I’M SURE
CS I DON'T THINK THAT ONE’S EVEN CLOSE
C3 YOU REALLY MISSED THAT ONE
C4 THAT ONE’S BAD, TOO
05 WOW! (OR: PHEEWIV!, ETC.)
The coding provided prompting cues for the agents: ”A ” was
for a moderately positive approval, "B” and ”C” were for
moderately and strongly negative criticism respectively.
The numbers and code letters indicated when, in the series
of performance trials, the agent used a particular
37
statement. The schedule of reinforcements for the various 
treatments is shown in Appendix B.
Administration of Training Tasks and Reinforcements:
Because inflection, tone, etc., are difficult to com­
municate in writing, rehearsals were held with the two 
agents. They role-played several administrations which 
were electrically recorded and played back several times 
for criticism and refinement of the roles. They were given 
further instructions to the extent that:
a. When administering a positive reinforcement series 
they were to greet the subject acceptingly, exchange a few 
amenities, and say "This is a pretty tough test;— but let's 
see how you do on it."
b. When administering a negative reinforcement series 
they were to greet the subject coolly, get right to work 
with "This is a pretty easy test so it probably wonTt give 
you any trouble at all," and retain a hypercritical, dis­
dainful manner.
c. At the close of a positive series they were to 
make a summary statement to the subject of his apparent 
success with the task.
d. At the close of a negative series they were to 
make a critical, almost sneering, summary statement.
The procedure schedule of tasks, reinforcement 
patterns, and agents was counterbalanced to control against
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any sequence or recency effects and to counterbalance any 
personal differences between the two agents which might 
have affected the results.
Procedure for any one subject began with his intro­
duction to the first agent he was to meet. This agent 
administered one of the tasks while providing the appro­
priate sequence of reinforcements. Upon completion, the 
subject was introduced to the second agent who took him 
into another testing room and administered the other task 
with the contrasting sequence of reinforcements. If the 
situation called for treatment III the procedure was the 
same as for a negative reinforcement experience except that 
the agent verbalized no appraisals during and following the 
subject's performance on the training task.
When the subject had completed the two successive 
sessions of reinforcement experience he went to a third 
room with the two agents and was joined by the experimenter. 
Three chairs were grouped in an arc opposite a table at 
which the experimenter sat. The entrance into the room by 
the two agents and the subject was always maneuvered so 
that the subject sat in the middle chair flanked by the 
agents.
The Accord Measurement Situation:
This session was introduced by the experimenter
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reading the instructions for the task:
INSTRUCTIONS
THIS IS PART OP THE STUDY OF HOW WELL PERSONS 
JUDGE AND DISCRIMINATE SIZES AND DISTANCES: IT IN­
VOLVES ESTIMATING THE LENGTH OF LINES. YOU WILL BE 
SHOWN TWENTY CARDS; ON EACH IS A LINE THAT IS SOME­
WHERE BETWEEN 65 AND 155 MILLIMETERS LONG. YOU WILL 
BE ASKED TO ESTIMATE THE LENGTH, IN MILLIMETERS, AS 
CLOSELY AS YOU POSSIBLY CAN.
WE ARE INTERESTED IN A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS IN 
THIS STUDY. FOR EXAMPLE,
A. ARE GROUP ESTIMATES BETTER THAN SINGLE 
ESTIMATES?
B. DOES TRAINING INCREASE A PERSON’S ACCURACY?
C. IF SO, WHICH METHOD OF TRAINING IS BEST?
WE ARE ALSO INTERESTED IN FINDING OUT WHAT PROPORTION 
OF SPECIALLY TRAINED PERSONS PROVIDES THE MOST 
ACCURATE GROUP.
IN THIS INSTANCE WE HAVE ONE UNTRAINED SUBJECT 
AND TWO INTENSIVELY TRAINED PERSONS, EACH OF THESE TWO 
SPECIALLY SELECTED AND TRAINED PERSONS HAS RECEIVED A 
GREAT DEAL OF PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTION— EACH IN A DIF­
FERENT METHOD OF ESTIMATION. FOR PURPOSES OF SCORING, 
ONE WILL BE CALLED "A" AND THE OTHER "B.” EACH TIME 
THEY WILL GIVE THEIR RESPONSES FIRST, BEFORE YOU DO.
ARE THERE ANY QUESTIONS?
There was usually a response by the subject to the in­
vitation for questions. Typically it went as follows: 
Subject: ”Yeh, how big is a millimeter?”
Experimenter: "Your not being familiar with milli­
meters is why you’re called the ’untrained subject,’ 
and that’s important in this experiment. The only hint 
I can give you, though, is that there are roughly 
twenty-five millimeters to an inch.”
In almost every case this seemed to satisfy the subject and
no more questions were raised.
It may also be noted here that the instructions recon­
ciled the superior status of the agents with their partici­
pation as experimental subjects. No actual subject men­
tioned or raised any question about this either during or
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after the sessions.
The stimulus oards were then hand-presented one at a 
time, Each was of white Bristol-board 11 by 6 in. with a 
length of -I inch wide, black cellophane tape affixed to it.3
Each of the agents responded with their guess of the 
length before the subject made his guess. They alternated
in making the first response on successive trials to con­
trol for any effect of recency of agent’s guess on the 
subject’s guess. The judges also randomized, between them, 
the high and low guess so as to offset any size-preference 
on the part of the subjects.
The agents’ guesses were not standard from subject to 
subject. They learned the actual length of the lines but 
were not required to make memorized responses. From the 
pre-testing experience this flexibility appeared as an 
insurance for spontaneity of the agent’s responses and 
reduce the chance of arousing the subject’s suspicions by 
the agents sounding automatic and mechanical.
In line with the difficulty this non-standardization 
might raise, several precautions were taken. First, after 
the agents had become acquainted with the actual length of 
the lines, we tested and found that even having a milli­
meter scale for reference, the best average guess that the 
two agents and the experimenter could make of the length of 
one of the stimuli held three feet away, was wrong by more 
than fifteen millimeters. In the experimental situation,
3The actual length of these lines, in millimeters, and 
in order of presentation were: 123, 96, 123, 146, 109, 82, 
124, 84, 109, 96, 120, 96, 108, 92, 114, 102, 111, 107,
121, and 127.
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there was no millimeter scale available and the stimuli 
were exposed at a distance that was greater than four feet 
from the subject.
The agents were then instructed that they were to keep 
their "guesses1’ to within nine or eleven millimeters of the 
real length. This they did, with less than a dozen minor 
slip-ups through a total of two thousand responses between 
them.
The additional question arose as to a possible differ­
ence between the two agents in respect to how far they 
tended to deviate from the true length. A sample of their 
deviation was taken after thirty-eight subjects had been 
tested experimentally. The mean deviation from true length 
for one agent was 7.11 millimeters and 7.30 millimeters for 
the other. This gave a t of .447 which, with df = 74, gave 
a probability between the .50 and .70 levels. Thus an 
hypothesis of difference in agent’s guessing deviations is 
not tenable.
There is considerable precedent, in the literature, 
for instruments of this type; where a confederate guesses a 
distance disparate either with reality or with a subject’s 
perception. Asch (3), in his study on a minority of one 
versus a unanimous majority, used a task which required the 
matching of one out of a combination of three lines with a
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standard line. TJie standard line was on one card and the 
three differing lines all on another card. There were 
twelve such sets and the stooges (seven to nine individuals 
who comprised the "unanimous majority”) all chose the same 
line each time. On six of these sets, however, the line 
chosen differed in length from the standard by from l/4 
inch to 1 3/4 inches. The standards were from 1 inch to 9 
inches long, Asch found that even these relatively large 
discrepancies could, in the test situation, displace the 
subject's choice from the correot solution (pp. 451-483).
Mausner, in a series of articles (24, 25) on various 
applications of reinforcement learning theory to social 
interaction in judgment, instructed confederates to make 
their judgments vary consistently by 4 to 5 inches from 
those given by the subject in an alone situation. The 
judgments were made of lines which varied in length from 
10 to 19 inches.
Kelman (15) had his subjects establish, in an alone 
situation, their individual standards for autokinetic 
judgments. The standard provides a base line for a later 
situation in which, when together with the subject, a con­
federate consistently gave judgments 5 inches greater.
The original standards established for the subjects ranged 
from 0.6 inches to 11.1 inches.
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Thus, historically, it would seem that subjects’ 
judgments of lengths can be substantially coerced. In the 
present study the pressure to disagree with reality was 
relatively low and the planted judgments were probably 




The data obtained in the experimental session were 
scored in the following nammer:
Degree of Accord = 100 f Is - pos.l ) __________
( )s - pos.j ) V "( |s-neg.j )
Where:
S represents the Subject’s estimates,
pos. represents the positive reinforcing agent’s 
estimates
neg. represents the negative reinforcing agent's 
estimates
(estimates are the guesses, in mm,, of the stim­
uli lengths)
Thus a percentage for each experimental subject was 
obtained by taking the difference between the subject's 
judgments and the positive agent's responses and dividing 
by the total difference of judgments between the subject 
and each of the two agents. The resultant was multiplied 
by 100 to erase the decimal point and provide a measure of 
the subject's degree of accord with the positive agent’s
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judgments. The results of these computations are shown in 
Table I.4
It should be pointed out here, to avoid confusion, 
that the smaller the score, the greater is the approach to 
agreement with the agent who administered the positive 
reinforcement. As the accord measure is derived from the 
differences between estimates, a score of less than 50 
shows less difference between the subject and the positive 
agent. On the other hand a score above 50 shows less dif­
ference, or a tendency for agreement, between the subject’s 
and the negative agent’s estimates. A score of exactly 50 
could be considered a score of indifference or of indeci­
sion.
Using the chi-square test, the null hypothesis that 
there is no difference in the number of subjects showing 
accord with the positive agent between the success-striving 
group (SS) and the failure-avoidant group (FA) is refuted 
at about the .07 level of confidence; chi-square is 3.2 
with dfsl. Despite a tendency for reversal of the
4 T w o  excess subjects were eliminated since the design 
called for an n of 8 in each of the six cells: One FAI sub­
ject whose scores fell at or about the mean of all scores 
for that cell; and an FA subject from treatment II, not on­
ly because his difference between the two agents was more 
than twice that of the next larger FA difference and thus 
apparently not from the same population, but also because 
he was able to correctly explain the purpose of the study 
and announced that he wouldn’t want to agree with the agent 
who had been critical of him. (See Appendix A which 
includes the data for these two subjeots.)
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TABLE I
S'OBJECTS’ DEGREES OF ACCORD WITH POSITIVE 
REINFORCING AGENT
PRE-TRAINING REINFORCEMENT TREATMENTS 
I II III
Moderate negative Strong negative None




"Success- 48 52 46
Striving"









"Failure- 50 49 51
Avoidant”





Mean 50.42 50.76 51.38
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prediction within the treatment II (moderate positive- 
strong negative) groups, the difference is in the direction 
predicted; i.e., fewer failure-avoidant subjects show accord 
with the positive reinforcer than sucoess-striving subjects.
More extensive study of the data was to proceed along 
the lines of analysis of variance. However, since our 
basic score is a proportion, an angular transformation 
(inverse sine) of the data was first necessary (40, pp.
423 f.).
After the transformation and the preliminary computa­
tions were made, but before application of the analysis of 
variance technique, a Bartlett's Test for homogeneity of 
variance was made (40, p. 193). B~*~ corrected = B z 38,80,
with df r 5, and thus the hypothesis that no difference 
existed among the population variances was untenable at 
less than the .001 level.®
Following through with the original intention of using 
a parametric analysis of variance on a contingency basis 
was rejected. It is unlikely that sufficient error of 
type I (rejection of null hypothesis when in fact it is 
true) was present in such a highly significant result to 
justify even a tentative disregard of the measure.
5The values of j32 for the six groups; each with n=8, 
were .01916, .02034, .00599, .0093, .01195, and .00137 
after the arosin transformation.
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Since the assumption of homogeneity of variance could 
not he met it was necessary to resort to non-parametric 
treatment of the data.
Table II shows the various combinations of cellular 
data sub jacted to statistical treatment by ranking methods. 
The first two result items represent a separation of the 
two rows in the matrix design with each row handled singly 
in a one criterion classification analysis of variance by 
ranks (40, pp. 436 ff.). This procedure provided tests of 
the null hypotheses that the three treatments had no diff­
erentiating effect on the degree of acoord scores of either 
the success-striving subjects (SS) or the failure-avoidant 
subjects (FA). The results show a significant difference 
of treatment effects among the three success-striving (S3) 
sub-groups.
The remaining items in Table II show results of tests 
of Sum of Ranks between various cells or groupings of cells 
(40, pp. 434 f.). Among these results we find that the 
success-striving group (SS) as a whole tend to show lower 
accord scores (i.e., more agreement with the positive rein­
forcer) than the failure-avoidant subjects (FA). With the 
treatment II groups (moderate positive-strong negative 
reinforcement) eliminated, this tendency attains statisti­
cal significance at better than the .05 level. Also, the 
results for the treatment III groups (moderate positive-
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TABLE II
RESULTS 02? STATISTICAL TESTS FOR VARIOUS COMBINATIONS 
OF EXPERIMENTAL SUB-GROUPS
Explanation of symbols:
SS: success-striving subjects 
FA: failure avoidant subjeots 
I: under conditions of moderate positive 
vs* moderate negative reinforcement 
II: under conditions of moderate positive 
vs* strong negative reinforcement 
III: under conditions of moderate positive 
vs, no explicit reinforcement
a/b: e.g., median score of ja greater than median of b_.
Sub-groups tested £ Direction
SSI-SSII-SSIII .01 ---- Analysis of Variance 




oCO• Analysis of Variance 
by ranks
FAI,II,III .14 FA/33 Sum of Ranks (40, 
pp. 434-5)
SSI-FAI .38 FA/SS n
SSII-FAII .40 SS/FA if
SSIII-FAIII .006 FA/SS «
SSI-SSII .34 II /I tt
SSI-SSIII .20 I/III Tf
SSII-SSIII .09 Il/lII tf
FAI-FAII .46 I/II tf
FAI-FAIII .44 III/I n
FAII-FAIII .19 III/II rt
SSI,III-FAI,III ,04 FA/SS tf
Note: jd/s for the Sum of Ranks results are one-tailed
tests, and two-tailed for the Analysis of Variance 
by ranks.
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no explicit reinforcement) show the sucoess-striving sub­
jects (SS) agreeing significantly more with the positive 
reinforcer than the failure-avoidant subjects (FA). In 
addition, the apparent reversal of the treatment II groups 
does not attain a statistically significant level.
It should be noted that where these latter tests are 
tantamount in purpose to a t test, they are not computed on 
the basis of a pooled variance estimate as would have been 
the procedure in the planned, parametric analysis of vari­
ance. Therefore, in Table II, relationships between either 
of the first two listed results and later results are 
obscured, and inferences about the significance or lack of 
significance in testing the sub-hypotheses are not refer­
able to the significance or lack of significance of the two 
analyses of variance by ranks.
In addition to extracting a degree of accord score, a 
t_ test was computed on the item-by-item performance by each 
subject on the experimental task. That is, a t of differ­
ences (23, pp. 225 f.) was made by taking the difference 
between the differences in estimates that a subject had 
with each of the two agents. The results of these computa­
tions are shown in Appendix A. The choice, of the number 
of suecess-striving (SS) and failure-avoidant (FA) subjects 
whose t/s are at a £ level of .25 or less, between the 
positive and negative agents gives a chi-square of 2,55 and
51
£, for If = 1, is .11 in the direction predicted. That is, 
SS subjects tend to agree with the positive agent and FA 
subjects tend to agree with the negative agent.
The t's described above also provide data for a test 
of part of the procedure used in this study. Four out of 
the 24 SS subjects have t’s at the .05 level or better as 
is also the case of four of the FA subjects. Since the t/s 
reflect the extent to which a subject’s estimates converged 
more toward one agent than the other, the conclusion is 
that a significant number of subjects chose one agent over 
the other at a significant level. More specifically, the 
probability of obtaining four significant (_£<;05) statis­
tics by chance in a group of twenty-four is less than .03 
(42).
Another consideration raised by the use of the above 
described statistic is the source of the differences used 
in computing the ;t. If a subject’s estimate of the length 
of a line lay outside the range embraced by the estimates 
of the two agents, then the difference between his estimate 
and those of each of the agents is equivalent to the dif­
ference between the two agent’s estimates. Thus, in a 
sense, some of the estimate items used in computing the t_ 
were independent of the subject’s performance and part of 
the variance was due to the agents alone. To explore this, 
sixteen subjects were chosen at random, eight SS and eight
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FA, and note taken of their pattern of responses in rela­
tion to the difference between the two agents* estimates. 
Table III shows the distribution of whether subjects’ 
responses were inside or outside the range enclosed by the 
agents* estimates depending upon the size of that range.
There are no demonstrable differences in the patterns 
of the SS sample and the FA sample. However, chi-squares 
are significant, at beyond the .01 level, between the 
"inside” and "outside" frequencies for the two ranges of 
differences, 0 through 3 and 4 through 6. Thus the occur­
rence of an outside response seems to be dependent on the 
degree of similarity between agent’s estimates.
Another area of the data explored for possible proce­
dural effects was whether there was preference for either 
of the two persons used in the agent’s roles. Table IY 
shows the distribution of degrees of accord of the sub­
jects according to which person played the role of positive 
reinforcer. Using the sum of ranks technique, the prob­
ability obtained was .56 (two-tailed test) and thus a null 
hypothesis that there was no differential preference for 
either of the two role-playing individuals cannot be 
rejected.
Table Y shows the distribution of degrees of accord 
according to which sequence of reinforcement patterns the 
subjects received; positive first and negative second or
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TABLE III
DISTRIBUTION OF "INSIDE” AND "OUTSIDE” ESTIMATES 
OF SUC0ESS-STRITING (SS) AND FAILURE-AVOIDANT (FA) 













Mi 1 9 4 4 1 1
m - 7 - 9 1 3
Ba 3 3 7 6 1 -
SS Ra 1 12 2 3 1 1
Li 1 3 4 6 3 3
Ca 3 10 1 2 3 1
Be 3 10 1 3 1 2
G1 1 11 3 4 — 1
Total SS 13 65 22 37 11 12
Ro 5 8 2 2 3 -
la 1 12 1 6 - -
Cr - 7 1 6 2 4
FA Le 1 5 4 9 - 1
Si - 14 2 3 - 1
Po - 8 2 8 1 1
Da - 6 1 11 2 . -
Co 5 5 5 5 m m
Total FA 12 65 18 50 8 7
TOTAL 25 130 40 87 19 19
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TABLE IT
SUBJECTS’ SCORES DISTRIBUTED ACCORDING 
TO WHICH EXPERIMENTAL ASSISTANT PLAYED 



























Sum of Ranks: D.B.: 559.5
T.P.: 616.5
z = .59
£ z .56 (two-tailed test)
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TABLE V
DISTRIBUTION OF SCORES WHEN POSITIVE REINFORCING 
SEQUENCE AND WHEN NEGATIVE REINFORCING 



























Sam of Ranks: Positive first: 587
Negative first: 589
z -  .08
£ s .98 (two-tailed test)
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vice versa. The sum of ranks test obtained a probability 
of .98 (two-tailed) and thus we are unable to refute a 
hypothesis that the application of reinforcement patterns 
showed no differential sequence effects.
CHAPTER VI
DISCUSSION
In general the results tend to confirm the predictions 
that reinforcement patterns are antecedentally related to 
an individual's choice between competing influences; also 
that this relationship differs depending upon the influ­
enced individual*s characteristic mode of response to fail­
ure or success. In addition there is some evidence that 
the contrast of reinforcing intensity between competing 
influencers is related to an individuals degree of choice 
between them— especially in the case of success-striving, 
achievement-oriented subjects.
There is strong suggestive evidence that success- 
striving, achievement-oriented individuals (SS) are more 
responsive to sources of approval than are cautious, 
failure-sensitive individuals (EA). If treatment II (mod­
erate positive-strong negative reinforcement) sub-groups 
are excluded, we find that the success-strivers (SS) accord 
with the positive reinforcing influence agent more than the 
failure-avoiders (EA) do beyond the .05 level of signifi­
cance. There is no procedural rationale for eliminating 
the treatment II sub-groups and doing so leads, admittedly, 
to a post-hoc interpretation. However, in the reversal of
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scores, the treatment II groups were presumably affected by 
strength or intensity of the reinforcements and we are con­
cerned, at this time, with the interaction between varia­
bles dealing with the sign of reinforcements and with indi­
vidual differences in characteristic responses to success- 
failure. Thus the level of difference between the two 
abbreviated subject classifications (SS and FA) lends 
plausibility to one of our predictions; namely, that 
failure-avoidant individuals (FA) are more responsive to 
negative, reinforcers than are success-striving individuals 
(SS).
The results uphold predictions about strength of rein­
forcement for the SS subjects but no inferences about the 
differential effect of the treatment conditions on FA sub­
jects can be gathered from the data. It will be remembered 
that under the three treatments all subjects received the 
same moderate positive reinforcement whereas it was the 
negative reinforcement sequences which were varied in 
intensity. Thus it would appear that SS subjects varied 
while the negative series also varied and that there were 
no statistical differences among the FA subjects just as 
there were no differences among the positive treatment 
series. This would seem to contradict the notion of SS's 
being responsive to sources of approval and FA*s to dis­
approval. It is important to note, therefore, that in
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speaking of strength of reinforcement we are referring to 
■fc-ke contrast, in terms of strength, between two agents of 
reinforcement.
Another feature of the data is the relatively striking 
difference between success-striving subjects (SS) and 
failure-avoidant subjects (FA) under the conditions of 
treatment III (moderate positive-ignoring, or no explicit 
reinforcement). The resulting responsiveness of SSfs to 
the positive reinforcer, the responsiveness of FAfs to the 
ignorer, and the significant difference between them were 
in the directions predicted.
Explanation of the data from the experiment refers 
back to the three general principles that were formulated 
from pertinent theoretical positions and previous studies 
reviewed in earlier portions. There are in addition, how­
ever, one or two points which merit further examination.
One of these points involves treatment condition II 
(moderate positive-strong negative reinforcement). Under 
conditions of treatment II there appeared to be a tendency 
for the difference between success-strivers and failure- 
avoiders to be opposite to the predicted direction. The 
extent of this reversed difference was too low to justify 
an interpretation that sensitivity to strongly critical 
agents was greater for SS*s than for FA’s. However, it is 
possible to speculate that the strong criticism approached
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the threshold of success-strivers* responsiveness to nega­
tive sources when the punitive agent’s reinforcements were 
intense enough to gain dominance over the reinforcements 
of the approving agent. It might also he conjectured that 
a reverse situation would approach the failure-avoiders’ 
threshold of responsiveness to the positive reinforoer. In 
a replicative study, then, it would seem desirable to add a 
pair of treatment IV sub-groups. The conditions of this 
suggested treatment would involve, for the SS’s and FA’s 
both, moderate negative reinforcement from one agent and 
strong positive reinforcement from the other.
The other point involves one of the more unequivocal 
findings of the study; more specifically, the differences 
between the success-striving sub-group (SS) and the failure- 
avoidant sub-group (FA) under conditions of treatment III 
(moderate positive-ignored, or no explicit reinforcement). 
The differences were in the predicted direction; i.e.,
SS’s agreed with the rewarding figure and FA’s agreed with 
the other figure. The question arises, however, as to what 
this "other figure" represented to the subjects. If the 
premise and analyses of the results of this study are cor­
rect, the ignorer in treatment III must have been experi­
mentally endowed with the nature of a criticizing, dis­
approving person.
In our culture, actively ignoring someone is construed
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as a form of disapproval or negative reinforcement. By 
actively ignoring we mean being aware of but not responding 
to someone else’s behavior. Ignoring, in this sense, con­
notes more than mere inattentiveness, which is a negative 
reinforcement in its own right, but something which goes 
even further and becomes a form of tacit repudiation. When 
someone turns a deaf ear to us or holds himself aloof, it 
is interpreted as a slur and a denial.
Another very important feature of being ignored is 
that it usually leaves us in an indefensible position. The 
ignorer, by the very act of ignoring, leaves us frustrated 
with few alternative means for gaining his attention or 
reconstructing, with any satisfaction, our position to 
which he paid no regard.
In the case of failure-avoidant subjects the data show 
no meaningful differences between treatments including 
strong negative reinforcement and ignoring. But, if ignor­
ing has a strong negative effect, why did not the 33*3 in 
treatment III tend to agree with the ignorer just as the 
SS’s in treatment II tended to agree with the strong nega­
tive reinforcer? This can best be answered by considering 
that a reinforcement is normally followed in sequence by 
new, related reinforcements. The value of the original (in 
a sequence) reinforcement is a function of the expectancies 
that this reinforcement will lead to the other, related
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reinforcements in the situation and to the values of these 
other reinforcements {5L, pp. 153, 164 f.). If these other 
reinforcements are opposite in sign to the original, the 
strengths would tend to counterbalance and the overall 
value would be diminished. If the signs of the original 
and related reinforcements were similar, the overall value 
would be enhanced. Then the success-strivers, in the 
ignoring situation, maybe received a negative impression 
from the ignorer but no cues for expecting to be able to 
redeem themselves through subsequent gratification from 
him. The SS’s in treatment II, however, because of the 
cues from an acknowledging reinforcer., could have expected 
to diminish the over-all strength of the negative rein­
forcement by shifting their choice and changing the sign of 
the related, subsequent reinforcement.
Before leaving the topic of "ignoring” it may be noted 
that while it is widely discussed in child psychology 
literature, for example, it has rarely been employed as a 
variable in experimental work. Elizabeth Hurlock (13), 
evaluating incentives used in sohool situations in 1925, 
employed ignoring as one of three independent variables.
She compared four equated groups in the fourth grade and 
in the sixth grade. Using equivalent, standardized arith­
metic test forms as pre- and post-test measures, she gave 
one group praise and another group reproval for their work.
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A third group received neither. All three groups were 
composed of units drawn from the same classroom and thus 
the subjects of any one group were present and aware of the 
evaluations received by members of the other two groups.
Her control group consisted of separate classes of pupils 
and thus they were unaware of the treatments received by 
the experimental subjects.
While her major finding dealt with the superiority of 
the continued use of praise, it is of interest here that 
the "ignoring” treatment also showed some incentive value, 
especially for the older boys and especially in the earlier 
trials.
Kelman (15) in his study also used a condition that 
lay between success and failure. After subjects had estab­
lished their baseline perception in an autokinetio situa­
tion, they were given an evaluation of their performance.
An "ambiguous" group received mostly negative reports. How­
ever, the last two items of their performance were -rewarded 
and they were told that "once an individual begins to get 
it, he generally keeps on being right." The ambiguous 
group, in a later session with an influencing confederate, 
showed a significantly higher suggestibility score than a 
group that had received a success experience in the initial 
session.
In the same study, Kelman also found, among other
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items, that the control, failure, and ambiguous groups had 
lower suggestibility scores the higher they were on a com­
posite score of factors of ascendancy, self-confidence, and 
lack of nervous tension (A, I, and N from the GAMIN). At a 
descriptive level, the reference to factors of ’’ascendancy” 
and "self-confidence” are analogous with the basis for 
dichotomizing subjects in the present study; success-striv­
ing and failure-avoidant.
At this point, a presentation of how SSfs and FATs may 
learn their characteristic modes of response can lend fur­
ther clarification to the above discussion and also serve 
some function in the statement about implications of this 
study which will follow.
We have seen, in the earlier discussion of "History 
and Background" that work with the level of aspiration con­
cept has found that individuals have more or less charac­
teristic and generalizable means of dealing with situations 
involving potential success or failure experiences. These 
characteristic means can be divided roughly into behavioral 
dichotomies which are called, descriptively, success- 
striving and failure-avoidant. The first designates behav­
ior which is oriented toward primary goal achievement, is 
ambitious, and where the expression of goals tends to be 
above past accomplishments. The other classification 
designates behavior which is in the direction of
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cautiousness or protectiveness as a defense against fail­
ure, and where the goals expressed tend to he below past 
accomplishments.
The learning of failure-avoidance as a modal pattern 
may stem from early learning of specific avoidant behaviors 
which originally were rewarded, either directly or indirect- 
ly, by averting punishment; such as a little boy always 
entering his house through the back door to avoid the bully 
he fears is waiting for him at the front. Though taking 
the long way around may be associated with some other 
events of a negatively reinforoing nature, these events are 
usually more remote in time and have relatively less effect 
on reducing the avoidant behavior than if they were asso­
ciated with it immediately. Thus the positive reinforce­
ment of avoiding immediate punishment has greater value for 
the behavior than the more remote negative reinforcements, 
which may be so delayed in time that the individual does 
not associate them with the behavior which provokes them.
Also very important to this process is the notion of 
ancillary reinforcements which may serve to strengthen the 
specific avoidant behaviors and to generalize them to other 
areas and situations. In the example of the little boy, 
above, he may enter the house with a clear show of fear or 
fright. In doing so he finds gratification from his mother 
who receives him attentively, gives him sympathy, and takes
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steps to protect him. Thus the avoidant behavior may not 
only avert some previously experienced specific negative 
reinforcement, but it also provides the channel for learn­
ing ways of obtaining other satisfactions. Also, the very 
nature of avoidance keeps the individual away from situa­
tions where he could experience reward for more venturous 
behaviors.
The success-oriented person, on the other hand, may 
have had parents who urged him generally to win and succeed 
in everything and to be better than most others. He was 
positively reinforced when he succeeded and not only was 
reproved for failure but was also reproved for not trying 
to meet the parents1 demands. In an atmosphere of this 
sort, the little boy might have found his mother belittling 
his fear and implying that she did not like sissies. Thus, 
the learning from the specific situation would generalize 
and extinguish non-achieving behaviors.
These patterns and the findings of the study carry 
implications into several areas. For example, the data 
bear some relevance to: studies of parental care in the
formation of a child1s attitudes and standards; the study 
of public response to different kinds of authority figures; 
possible leads for further study of small group formation; 
research in leadership function and emergence; and sugges­
tions for psychotherapy; inter alia.
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In the case of psychotherapy with children, as an 
illustration, the premises of this study imply some cri­
teria for determining which significant figure in the 
child's life is dominantly reinforcing and whom might be 
seen adjunctively to best advantage. Not only could this 
significant figure be worked with to change his or her own 
response pattern to the child, but also to reinforce, in 
accordance with therapy goals, those behaviors of the child 
which occur too infrequently for the therapist to handle.
Another illustration involves the notion of therapist- 
client relationship. This has been called, and defined by 
Rotter (31, pp. 367 f.) as the degree of involvement. The 
degree of involvement is seen as a function of the amount 
of direct reinforcement that the client has received or 
expects to receive and it is a function of the degree to 
which the client sees his future satisfactions as being 
dependent upon the therapist’s behavior.
If the client characteristically responds in an avoid­
ant way, his expectancies for future satisfactions from the 
therapist will be based more on avoiding criticism from him 
than on receiving positive reinforcement. If the avoidant 
behaviors go unscathed in the therapy situation, the 
resultant is that they become further reinforced and little 
change in the maladaptive behaviors can be expected. If 
the avoidant behaviors are criticized, however, the
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probable result would be an additional avoidance on the 
part of the client— that of not airing or mentioning his 
troubles. The problem then is one of diminishing the 
satisfaction value of the maladaptive, avoidant behaviors 
without the danger of creating new ones which would make 
the old ones even more invulnerable to change. This may be 
done by the therapist playing up and emphasizing the nega­
tive values of the delayed, or remote consequences to 
reduce whatever was the positive value associated with the 
avoidant behavior. At the same time, the therapist may 
depreciate the ancillary gratifications by showing how 
attention- or sympathy-getting behavior, for example, are 
viewed with disfavor culturally. In essence, the therapist 
would be using the greater potential of a negative rein­
forcer, for a failure-avoidant person, to reduce rather 
than strengthen avoidance patterns. If the therapist 
merely played the role of an approving figure for a 
failure-avoidant client, he would probably have to wait 
long intervals for the opportunity of positively reinforc­
ing pertinent non-avoidant behaviors. At the same time he 
would also be sponsoring his status as a relatively undom­
inant, ineffective reinforcer. Thus, not only would the 
degree of involvement be slow in developing, changes in 
adaptive behavior would also be slow in emerging.
Before closing this discussion some remarks about,
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and evaluation of the experiment’s design, instruments and 
procedures are indicated.
It will be remembered that many previous studies of 
influence, especially those in the area of "imitation" 
(imitation is construed here as but one form or restricted 
measure of a more inclusive concept of personal influence) 
have employed a simple change-in-behavior design. Often, 
they have measured the effects of but one set of external 
pressures on an individual’s behavior in any given situa­
tion. The present design, on the other hand, has attempted 
a kind of double-diadic choioe situation that would be, 
e.g., more similar to that of a child whose parents were 
dissimilar in respect to their rewardingness. The results 
would suggest that simply measuring the extent of an 
agent’s rewardingness might not be as predictive of imita­
tion— or influence— as it would if supplemented with a 
measurement of the agent’s relative intensity as a rein­
forcer, either positive or negative.
In terms of the design and the procedures used in this 
study there are a number of recommendations for further 
work. The response measure could be improved by being 
treated somewhat differently and removing some of the 
effect of the between-agents’ variance on the subject's 
estimates. One proposal might be the use of a scale in 
which the subject indicated "closer” or "much closer" for
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whichever of the two agents* estimates he felt was more 
accurate. This would avoid subjectsT "outside” estimates 
and the interpretive difficulties they provide. In effect 
this would furnish a four-point scale not only indicating 
choice but also some measure as to how willing a subject 
might be to make relatively strong choices. A note of cau­
tion is needed here, however. There would be more proba­
bility of getting alternating behavior from the subject in 
a frequency count of neither-orn choioes and evidence of 
either agentfs influence might be eclipsed.
Another refinement would be to standardize the agentsr 
responses and make them disparate enough for expecting a 
substantial proportion of the subject's estimates to fall 
inside the range of the agents. This, too, is not without 
danger. The greater the disparity between the agents, the 
greater the unreality of the situation with possible conse­
quent suspioiousness on the part of the subject. Also, 
with standardized responses, which the agents would be 
required to memorize, there would probably be less role- 
playing spontaneity in the experimental session— especially 
after a number of subjects had been run— and suspicion
a
might again be elicited. In any event, the response
Harriet Linton (SI) found twelve subjects, out of a 
total sample of 45 in an autokinetic influence situation, 
who reported deliberate attempts to avoid being influenced. 
It is quite probable that a supplementary variable, such as
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measure situation certainly merits further work.
The experience or reinforcement situations also pro­
voke some question. While there is statistical evidence of 
some coercive effect upon the subjects in the later, exper­
imental session there is much room for improvement that 
further study might provide. For example, is whatever 
coercive effect shown a function of the dosage or of the 
concentration of the treatment? That is, are a series of 
twenty reinforced trials adequate to obtain the measure­
ments desired or would even fewer trials but with better 
reinforcement items be more economical?
In respect to the classification measure, there also 
is a need for more data. Validation data for the Rotter- 
Jensen Group Level of Aspiration is minimal, especially for 
the college population used in this study. A better instru­
ment, but less experimentally economical, would be the 
individual administration of the Rotter Level of Aspiration 
board on which there is substantially more data.
6(cont’d.) Linton calls "negativism," would mask the 
tendencies of some subjects’ choices of influencing object 
enough to warrant partialing out such an effect beforehand. 
If Linton’s interpretation, and our translation of that in­
terpretation, is valid, negativistic subjects are more 
characteristically failure-avoidant basically but overcom­
pensate for insecurity about their own judgment by being 
self-assertive. Thus we might suspect that some of the FA 
or SS subjects in the present study were compensating nega- 
tivistics. However, we would not know in which direction 
they compensated. One guess might be that this negativism 
could account for some of the "outside" estimates which was 
the best alternative available for not agreeing with either 
one of the agents.
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Even if the individual level of aspiration were used, 
there could still he some question as to how effectively 
the subjects had been classified as being either success- 
strivers or failure-avoiders. There are limitations in the 
ability of level of aspiration instruments to predict very 
broad concepts of generalized expectancy as were employed 
in this study.
In Social Learning Theory (31), level of aspiration 
bids can be thought of as being based on past experiences 
in situations perceived as the same (E-*-) and generalized 
expectancy (G-E) for similar reinforcements to occur among 
different situations for similar or functionally related 
behaviors (p. 166), The effect of the generalized expect­
ancy (G-E) "will weigh more heavily in situations that might 
be described as novel than in those in which the subject 
has had a series of experiences (51, p. 166).” While our 
subjects had not had past experiences with either the 
particular level of aspiration test used or a similar one, , 
as college students they had had exposure to numerous pre­
vious academic test situations plus a varying number of 
intelligence tests (some of which also had used digit- 
substitution items). Therefore, it is reasonable to be­
lieve that the bids contained substantial elements of E1 
(past experiences in situations perceived as the same) 
with corresponding relative reduction in GE (generalized
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expectancy). In other words, the more the subject per­
ceived the task as academic, the more dilution there would 
be in a measure of his generalized expectancy in social 
situations.
Therefore it would be useful for increasing predict­
ability of the effects of personal influence to determine 
the kind of characteristic behavior, achievement or avoid­
ant oriented, that an individual uses in specific situa­
tions or need areas. A more specific level of aspiration 
task, functionally related to social interaction with 
influencing figures and more comparable to the conditions 
and figures of the present study, conceivably would have 
been more predictive.
Because there are some findings of positive relation­
ship between level of aspiration behavior and some outside 
criteria, its use can be justified. However, the question 
of increasing predictability argues for complementing the 
measure with other approaches for evaluating and classify­
ing responses to potential failure.
It is quite possible, therefore, that our speculation 
about those parts of the study which did not concur with 
our predictions might be unnecessary. Or it may be that, 
with a demonstrably highly valid instrument, improved 
design, and refined procedures our speculative discussion 
might have been considerably different. Thus, a great
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amount of work remains to be done.
CHAPTER VII
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this study was to examine the ante­
cedent effects of paired reinforcement patterns on an indi­
vidual in a personal influence situation requiring his 
choice between the two reinforcing agents.
Three general propositions relating to personal influ­
ence were derived from study of theoretical formulations 
and pertinent research: that personal influence is a func­
tion of the sign of the reinforcements administered by 
significant figures; that there is a relationship between 
personal influence and the intensity of these reinforce­
ments; and that individuals differ in their characteristic 
responsiveness to positive and to negative reinforcement.
Integrating these propositions led to predictions that 
individuals with characteristic failure-avoidant behaviors 
when faced with potential failure are more responsive to 
influencing pressures from negatively reinforcing figures 
than are individuals who can be characterized as achieve­
ment-oriented or success-striving. It was also hypoth­
esized that, in a choice situation, both success-striving 
and failure-avoidant individuals would vary in their 
responsiveness to either of two influencing agents
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depending on the intensity of the reinforcements employed 
by the two competing agents.
To test the predictions £4 success-striving and £4 
failure-avoiding male college subjects were selected by use 
of a group level of aspiration test. Each of the subject 
categories was divided randomly among three treatment con­
ditions. These consisted of situations in which a subject 
received a combination of moderately positive approval from 
one agent and one of the following: moderate criticism,
strong disapproval, or ignoring from the other agent de­
pending upon the treatment condition to which the subject 
was assigned. In a later test situation the subject was 
required to give his appraisal of a stimulus after the two 
agents had announced their own evaluations which were in 
disagreement. Taking a measure of how much the subject’s 
judgments differed from the agents’ indicated his degree 
of accordance with each of them.
The results did not all unequivocally support the 
hypotheses. However, the tendencies were, on the whole, 
relatively strong and in the predicted direction. The 
treatment conditions concerning variations in the contrast 
between the two agents’ reinforcing intensities were 
associated with a significant difference of influence 
effects among the three success-striving sub-groups. Also, 
there was a recognizable trend for the success-strivers to
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more strongly accord with the positive agent than the 
failure-avoidant subjects. Under conditions of moderate 
positive reinforcement from one agent and ignoring from the 
other, the difference between success-strivers and failure- 
avoiders attained statistical significance. The condition 
consisting of moderate positive and strong negative rein­
forcements yielded, at a very low statistical level, a 
tendency opposite to that predicted in that the success- 
strivers showed more accord with the negative agent than 
did the failure-avoiders.
The data were reviewed with discussion of the results 
and their implications. Suggestions were made for further 
needed study and improvement in procedures.
From the results it is concluded that:
1. In a choice situation, an individual will be in­
fluenced more by one source of reinforcements than 
another depending upon the pattern of approval or 
disapproval the individual has previously experienced 
from both of the influencing persons, specifically; 
a. There is a tendency for characteristically 
success-striving individuals to accord more 
with the approving person than individuals 
who are characteristically failure-avoidant; 
and failure-avoiders tend to be more influ­
enced by the disapproving or ignoring person
than the success-strivers.
Success-strivers are influenced to different 
extents depending upon the difference or 
contrast between the strengths of approval 
and disapproval previously experienced from 
the two influencing persons.
Maximum differences occurred under condi­
tions of approval contrasted with ignoring 
to the extent that seven of eight success- 
strivers accorded with the approver and 
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Tabulation of subjects’ measures according
to their sub-group assignment
Explanation of symbols:
SS: Success-striving subjects 
FA: Failure-avoiding subjects 
’f”: Positive reinforcing agent
Negative reinforcing agent 
LoA: Level of aspiration
DAcc: Degree of accord with positive reinforcing agent
I: Treatment condition I; moderate positive rein­
forcement from one agent and moderate negative 
reinforcement from other agent 
II: Treatment condition II; moderate positive rein­
forcement from one agent and strong negative 
reinforcement from other agent 
III: Treatment condition III; moderate positive rein­
forcement from one agent and no explicit 












131 116 -15 .863 .40 +0.583 6 53
64 75 11 .9839 .35 *1.750 8 46
257 229 -28 1.227 .25 ♦0.167 6 53
SS 82 150 68 2.103 .05 ♦■2.250 8 35
I 62 66 4 .2621 .80 -0.417 9 48
106 94 -12 .739 .45 -0.417 4 53
88 70 -18 1.415 .20 *0.250 3 56
81 104 23 1.201 .25 0.000 5 44
74 52 -18 1.457 .20 ♦-1.833 5 59
128 125 - 3 .1274 .90 ♦-0.583 6 51
79 73 - 6 .3906 .70 ♦-1.916 6 52
SS 79 64 -15 .9836 .35 ♦•2.250 5 55
II 201 185 -16 .7825 .45 *0.750 7 52
82 125 43 2.3707 .03 *1.250 10 40
126 109 -17 .9928 .35 0.000 7 54
67 107 40 3.1017 .01 -0.333 4 39
85
APPENDIX A (Continued) 
Tabulation of subjects’ measures according 












156 17 2 16 .7414 .50 *•0.333 3 48
144 170 26 1.4030 .15 -0.500 6 46
61 88 27 2.3120 .03 *-0.167 5 41
SS 198 202 4 .1840 .85 -0.083 7 50
III 74 97 23 1.2330 .20 *-0.083 7 43
125 126 3 .1557 .85 r-0.083 3 49
121 143 22 .9789 .35 *-0.417 2 46
104 91 -13 .1526 .85 *-1.083 7 53
59 51 - 8 .7414 .45 , -1.500 5 54
145 127 -18 1.2172 .25 - 1 . 0 0 0 4 53
117 117 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 1.00 -1.083 11 50*
100 101 1 .0556 .95 -2.250 11 50
FA 219 163 -56 2.652 .02 -1.833 5 57
I 73 73 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 1.00 -4.083 7 50
97 122 25 1.4028 .15 -1.750 6 44
107 98 - 9 .2618 .80 -2.583 8 52
116 151 35 2.1084 .05 -1.083 8 43
58 67 9 .7495 .45 -2.333 8 46
107 182 75 3.1177 .01 -0.916 8 37*
94 98 4 .2437 .80 -0.833 8 49
188 134 -54 2.3440 .05 -1.667 8 58
FA 203 182 -21 1.1644 .25 -1.250 9 53
78 54 -24 1.8380 .10 -2.083 10 59
241 250 9 .3099 .75 -1.916 5 49
141 151 10 .4100 .70 -7.167 7 48
42 54 12 2.5641 .02 -2.083 4 44
154 162 8 .4884 .65 -3.500 5 49
115 110 - 5 .2097 .85 -1.500 4 51
97 93 - 4 .2149 .85 -1.667 8 51
FA. 138 113 -25 1.5300 .15 -3.583 8 55
Ill 342 337 - 5 .20 27 .85 -3.666 8 50
189 180 - 9 ,4168 .70 -2.000 7 51
^Excluded from results; see footnote No. 4.
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Tabulation of subjects' measures according 





"*•" D t. jd Score Shifts DAcc
131 118 -13 .7592 .45 -1.667 6 53




Schedule of agent-administered verbal reinforcements 
Moderate positive Moderate negative Strong negative





4 * B3 B3 C3
5. A2 B3 B3
6. A4 B2 C3
7. A2 B3 Cl
8. A2 B4 C5
9. B4 A5 Al
10. Al B3 C4
11. Al B1 C4
12. A5 Al A5
13. — — —
14. A3 B4 C3
15. Al B2 C4
16. Al B3 C2
17. A2 B3 B3
18. B5 A3 Al
19. Al B2 Cl
20. Al B3 03
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